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DISABILITY-BASED HARASSMENT: STANDING AND
STANDARDS FOR A "NEW" CAUSE OF ACTION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
received 80,000 ADA-based complaints between 1992 and 1997;
twelve percent, or approximately 9600, were harassment related.'
Like women and minorities, people with disabilities have faced
barriers in obtaining and maintaining employment in the American
workplace. 2 The eagerly-awaited and much-heralded Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) s was enacted to provide legal
recourse for individuals who have suffered discrimination on the
basis of a disability.4 Nevertheless, it was not until eleven years
later that a federal court of appeals explicitly recognized a cause of
action for disability-based harassment.'
1. Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 369
(1997) (citingEmploymentRateofPeople with Disabilities Increases Since Enactment ofADA,
NEWSL. OF GREAT LAKES DISABIrrY& Bus. TECHNICALASSISTANCE CENTER REGION V NEWS
(Institute on Disability and Human Development, Chicago, Ill.), Summer 1996, at 4).
2. The congressional findings section of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides in
part:
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is
growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such
critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services,
voting, and access to public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have
experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal
recourse to redress such discrimination ....
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000).
3. Id. §§ 12101-12213.
4. Id. § 12101(b).
5. Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
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On March 30, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the ADA embodies a claim for disability-
based harassment.6 A mere two weeks later, the Fourth Circuit
followed suit, declaring that a hostile work environment claim is
cognizable under the ADA.7 Though not the only courts to confront
the issue,' the Fourth and Fifth Circuits were the first to explicitly
recognize the cause of action. These cases provide a necessary and
critical extension of existing harassment law, but questions remain
unanswered regarding who may assert such claims and the
appropriate standard to apply in determining whether the alleged
conduct is actionable.
Despite the similarity of the holdings in Flowers v. Southern
Regional Physician Services, Inc.9 and Fox v. General Motors
Corp.,1° the two circuit courts parted ways in their analyses of the
elements required to establish a prima facie case of disability
harassment. Whereas the Flowers court required that a plaintiff
prove that she is a member of the "protected class,""' the Fox court
held that a complainant must be a "'qualified individual with a
disability.'"'2 To the extent that there is a difference between these
two standards, and this Note argues that there is, the effect of
accepting one standard over the other could be profound.
A further issue not raised in either Flowers or Fox is the
appropriate standard to determine whether an employer's state-
ments and/or conduct constitute actionable harassment. Although
the Supreme Court, at least in the context of sexual harassment,
has employed both objective and subjective tests to ascertain
whether conduct is sufficiently severe and pervasive to be unlawful
under Title VII," scholarly debate continues to rage about whether
the "reasonable person" standard provides sufficient protections for
the concerns of women, minorities, and people with disabilities.
Plaintiffs and disability law scholars have argued that disability-
6. Id.
7. Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
8. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
9. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
10. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
11. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 235.
12. Fox, 247 F.3d at 177 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
13. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
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based harassment must be judged from the perspective of a
"reasonable person with the same disability" in order to adequately
protect the wide variation of interests among people with different
disabilities.1'
This Note will address the rationale for extending the availability
of hostile work environment claims to individuals with disabilities,
explore which types of plaintiffs should be protected, and examine
the appropriate standard to determine when conduct constitutes
harassment for purposes of the ADA. Part I traces the development
of harassment law under Title VII in order to shed light on the
methodological approach generally employed in harassment cases
and emphasizes the value of a consistent approach to rights-based
legislation. Part II sets forth the case for disability harassment,
examines the analyses employed by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits,
and evaluates the elements of a prima facie disability harassment
case. This Part concludes that a plaintiff's qualifications are ir-
relevant in a harassment suit, and further suggests that courts
should consider the effect that limiting the definition of disability
will have on these types of cases. Finally, Part III analyzes the
appropriate standard for assessing whether an employer's conduct
is sufficiently severe and pervasive to be actionable under the ADA,
and ultimately argues that the costs of employing a disability-
focused standard outweigh the benefits.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HARASSMENT LAW UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is
unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
14. See, e.g., Pirolli v. World Flavors, Inc., No. 98-3596, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18092, at
*21 n.9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1999), rev'd in part, 263 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Casper
v. Gunite Corp., No. 99-3215, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16241, at *8-12 (7th Cir. July 11, 2000);
Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability and Structure of a
Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (1994); Christine Neagle, Comment An Analysis of the Applicability
of Hostile Work Environment Liability to the ADA, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 715 (2001).
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or national origin ...." Despite the fact that harassment is nowhere
mentioned in the statute, it nevertheless emerged as a cause of
action under Title VII as courts began to recognize that it could, in
effect, alter the terms and conditions of an individual's employ-
ment.
16
The recognition of sexual harassment as a cognizable legal claim
was spurred by the work of Professor Catharine MacKinnon 7 and
was first officially acknowledged by the United States Supreme
Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson."8 Two distinct forms of
the claim are regularly articulated: quid pro quo harassment 9 and
hostile work environment harassment.20 The Meritor Court defined
15. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (2000).
16. See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAw 4 (1999).
17. Professor MacKinnon significantly influenced the development of sexual harassment
jurisprudence both through her writing and in her role as co-counsel in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See Brief of Respondent Mechelle Vinson, Meritor Say. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979); CATHARINEA. MACKINNON, SEXUALHARASSMENT
OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). For an overview of influential
literature regarding sexual harassment, see Martha Chamallas, Essay, WritingAbout Sexual
Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 37 (1993).
18. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
19. In quid pro quo harassment, employment or promotion is conditioned on sexual
favors. See Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 307, 308 (1998) (defining quid pro quo harassment, but arguing that it
should be abandoned as a separate and distinct category). But see Steven H. Aden, Esq.,
"Harm In Asking": A Reply to Eugene Scalia and an Analysis of the Paradigm Shift in the
Supreme Court's Title VII Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 477 (1999) (arguing that quid pro quo harassment is and will continue to be a useful tool
in Title VII sexual harassment analysis).
20. Hostile work environment harassment occurs when the workplace is permeated with
"discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
Although this Note will focus primarily on the development of sexual harassment law and
its implications for the ADA, it is important to recognize that the hostile environment claim
originated in the context of racial discrimination and has been applied in religion and
national origin cases as well. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
(holding that Title VII prohibits "the practice of creating a working environment heavily
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination"); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157
(S.D. Ohio 1976) (holding that the defendant employer's harassment and verbal abuse toward
the plaintiffbecause of his Jewish ancestry and faith amounted to discrimination in violation
of Title VII). The use of the hostile environment claim in sex-based harassment cases was
largely supported by analogies drawn from the racial context. See, e.g., Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982). In Henson, the court stated:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement
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and developed guidelines for analyzing a hostile environment claim,
largely adopting the model set forth by the EEOC.2 According to
the Court, a plaintiff can establish a claim for hostile work
environment harassment by proving that (1) she encountered
"'sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature";22 (2) 'the conduct was
unwelcome;23 (3) the conduct had "the purpose or effect of unreason-
ably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment";24 (4)
the conduct was based on her sex;25 and (5) the harassment was
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.' 26
However, the Court's opinion in Meritor raised as many questions
as it answered. Lower courts were left to determine important
issues such as
that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege
of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
Id.
21. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67.
22. Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). Some argue that this element is too
limited. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,
1689 (1998) (challenging the "sexual desire-dominance paradigm" as inadequate, and arguing
that "[t]he focus should be on conduct that consigns people to gendered work roles that do
not further their own aspirations or advantage").
23. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 68 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). For criticisms of
the unwelcomeness requirement, see Susan Estrich, Sex At Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813,826-
34 (1991); Joan S. Weiner, Note, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law:
Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (1997); Casey J. Wood,
Note, "Inviting Sexual Harassment'. The Absurdity of the Welcomeness Requirement in
Sexual Harassment Law, 38 BRANDEIs L.J. 423 (2000).
24. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(aX3) (1985)).
25. Id. at 66.
26. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(1982)). For criticisms of the "severe or pervasive" requirement, see e. christi cunningham,
Preserving Normal Heterosexual Male Fantasy: The 'Severe or Pervasive' Missed-
Interpretation of Sexual Harassment in the Absence of a Tangible Job Consequence, 1999 U.
CHi. LEGAL F. 199 (1999) (arguing that the 'severe or pervasive" requirement reifies sex
inequality in the workplace and is contrary to the intent of the 1991 Amendments to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); see also Estrich, supra note 23.
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whether conduct of a sexual nature was unwelcome, whether
such conduct was severe or pervasive enough to support a claim,
whether severity or pervasiveness should be judged by a
subjective or an objective standard, whether a "reasonable
person" or a "reasonable woman" standard should govern
assessment of severity or pervasiveness, whether a victim must
establish psychological harm and, importantly, under which
circumstances an employer may be held liable for sexual
harassment engaged in by supervisors, coworkers, or even
customers.27
Seven years later, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. ,2 the Supreme
Court clarified some of these issues. Most notably, the Harris Court
held that the appropriate standard for determining whether
conduct is harassing is both objective and subjective.29 In other
words, to be actionable under Title VII, both the proverbial
"reasonable person" and the victim herself must perceive the
environment as hostile or abusive. The Court also recognized,
however, that a determination of hostility or abusiveness is not "a
mathematically precise test,"0 but "can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances." 1 A trier of fact should consider
frequency, severity, the physical or verbal nature of the conduct,
and the level of interference with the victim's work performance. 2
II. THE CASE FOR DISABILITY-BASED HARASSMENT
The ADA is built upon the civil rights approach adopted by Title
VII," and consequently, disability harassment as a cause of action
27. Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme Court
Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 727 (1999) (footnotes
omitted).
28. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
29. Id. at 21-22.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id.
33. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,
426-28 (1991); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 31-33 (2000); see also Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA's
Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 388
(2001) (suggesting that "premising the ADA on civil rights premises in general, and on the
1494 [Vol. 44:1489
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is modeled after the Title VII harassment claim."' Courts that have
explicitly recognized a hostile environment claim under the ADA
have posited that the parallel purposes, language, and remedial
structures of the statutes not only justify, but "command [a]
conclusion that the ADA provides a cause of action for disability-
based harassment."
5
Both statutes share the common purpose of eradicating
discrimination against groups historically treated as second-class
citizens. Whereas the proclaimed purpose of Title VII is "to elim-
inate ... discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion,
or national origin,"3 6 the explicitly stated purpose of the ADA is "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabil-
ities."37 The drafters of the ADA recognized that individuals with
disabilities, like women and racial minorities, have long faced
isolation, segregation, and discrimination not only in the workplace,
but in almost every aspect of life, and have often had no recourse to
a legal remedy.38 And as with Title VII, it would be unfathomable
for the legislature to open the doors of the American workplace to
people with disabilities only to have them forced out by harassing
behavior.
Similarly, the language of the ADA mirrors that of Title VII,
prohibiting discrimination "against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
[employment-related practices] and other terms, conditions, and
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in particular, may have in many respects served to hamper, rather
than promote, the ADA's objectives"); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples,
Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy
for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1398 (1993) (comparing the medical
model, social pathology model, and the civil rights model, and arguing that "[d]espite Ithel
civil rights agenda, the ADA is also a medical and social pathology model bill that continues
to treat people with disabilities as inherently inferior").
34. Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229,235 (5th Cir. 2001) ("A cause
of action for disability-based harassment is 'modeled after the similar claim under Title
VII.'") (quoting McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558,563 (5th Cir. 1998));
Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that the elements of a
disability-based hostile environment claim "laippropriately modiflied] the parallel Title VII
methodology").
35. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 234.
36. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964)).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(bXl) (2000).
38. Id. §§ 12101(a)(2)-12101(a)(4).
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privileges of employment."3 9 The Supreme Court has construed the
"terms, conditions, and privileges" language in Title VII as a means
to "'strike at'" harassing behavior in the workplace.40 Thus, to
provide consistency in statutory interpretation and equality of
protection, the language of the ADA is justifiably read as providing
a basis for a harassment cause of action.
A. Assuming a Cause of Action
Disability-based harassment is not a rarity in the workplace. As
previously noted, the EEOC receives thousands of harassment-
related ADA complaints every year.41 Prior to Flowers and Fox,
when confronted with these types of grievances, appellate courts
assumed, without actually tackling the question directly, that a
cause of action for disability-based harassment indeed existed
under the ADA."2 Yet, these courts have declined to rule explicitly
when the cases were not factually appropriate to make such a
determination. For example, inMcConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up
Corp.,' the Fifth Circuit found the defendant's actions to be
"insensitive and rude," but "not ... sufficient as a matter of law to
state a claim of hostile environment harassment.""" Therefore,
although the court assumed the existence of such a cause of action,
the per curiam opinion made clear that the "case should not be cited
39. Id. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a
disability" as a person "who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential function of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. §
12111(8).
40. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). Professor Mark Weber argues that §
12203(b), which makes it unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
individual in the exercise or enjoyment of... any right granted or protected" by Title I or the
ADA, may provide even greater protection against harassment. Mark Weber, Workplace
Harassment Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A New Interpretation, 14
STAN. L. & POLY REV. (forthcoming 2003).
41. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
42. See Casperv. Gunite Corp., No. 99-3215, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16241 (7th Cir. July
11, 2000); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1999); Walton v. Mental Health
Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 1999); Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 153 F.3d 681 (8th Cir.
1998); McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam);
Miranda v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 1996).
43. 131 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
44. Id. at 564.
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for the proposition that the Fifth Circuit recognizes or rejects an
ADA cause of action based on hostile environment harassment."45
B. Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services, Inc."6
Three years later, however, the Fifth Circuit became the first
federal circuit court to affirmatively identify disability-based
harassment as a cause of action under the ADA. In Flowers, the
plaintiff, a medical assistant employed by the defendant, filed suit
under the ADA, claiming that she was terminated as a result of her
disability and was subjected to harassment "designed to force [her]
from her position or cast her in a false light for the purpose of
terminating her because of her HIV status."47 Upon learning of Ms.
Flowers' diagnosis, Flowers' immediate supervisor, once a close
friend, "began intercepting [her] telephone calls [and] eaves-
dropping on her conversations."' 8 The company president "refused
to shake [her] hand,""9 and called her insulting names.50 Within a
one-week period, she was subjected to four random drug tests.5
Twice she was lured into meetings under false pretenses, during
which she was subsequently reprimanded.52 The court acknowl-
edged that a claim for disability-based harassment was viable
under the ADA and outlined the elements a plaintiff must establish
to successfully bring such a claim. According to the Fifth Circuit, a.
plaintiff must prove:
(1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she was
subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment
complained of was based on her disability or disabilities; (4) that
the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment; and (5) that the employer knew or
45. Id. at 563.
46. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
47. Id. at 231-32 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).
48. Id. at 236.
49. Id. at 237.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 237.
52. Id.
20031 1497
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt,
remedial action."
Ultimately, the court concluded that although the evidence was
sufficient to support a jury's finding of harassment,54 "Flowers
failed to present any evidence of actual injury" that entitled her to
anything more than nominal damages.55
C. Fox v. General Motors Corp.56
Fourteen days after the Fifth Circuit announced its decision in
Flowers, the Fourth Circuit also found that "a hostile work
environment claim [is] cognizable under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ...."" Robert Fox, a long-time employee of General
Motors, suffered a non-work-related back injury in 1980.8 As a
result of this injury, Fox was placed on disability leave several
times and subsequently returned to work.59 In October 1994, Fox
once again returned to GM from leave, but was restricted to light
duty work by his doctor."0 During this period, he claimed he was
subjected to verbal insults, humiliation, and harassment as a result
of his disability. Coworkers and supervisors "took pictures of the
tasks that Fox performed, attempting to prove that those tasks
were no different, in terms of the effect on Fox's back, than the
tasks Fox refused to perform because of his disability.""' He, and
others placed on light duty, were called "handicapped MF's" and
"911 hospital people." 2 The general foreman, at a meeting
assembled to discuss Fox's work limitations and the ongoing
harassment, crudely asked," [h] ow in the F- do you take a S-H-I-T
53. Id. at 235-36 (quoting McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 563
(5th Cir. 1998)).
54. Id. at 237.
55. Id. at 239.
56. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
57. Id. at 172.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 173.
62. Id. at 174.
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with these restrictions?"3 In light of such evidence, the court
upheld the jury verdict in Fox's favor.6
III. EVALUATING THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in Fox agreed that the
ADA creates a cause of action for hostile work environment
harassment. However, in contrast to the Fifth Circuit's "member of
a protected group" standard,65 the Fourth Circuit required the
plaintiff to prove that "he is a qualified individual with a
disability."6 6 The critical question is whether the difference in the
language used by the courts amounts to different standards.
The language employed by the Fourth Circuit is taken directly
from the ADA itself, which defines a "qualified individual with a
disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
a reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position ... ."7 The "protected group" language in
the Flowers opinion, on the other hand, mirrors the element
necessary to establish a prima facie case for harassment under Title
VII. 68 Arguably, the Fifth Circuit's requirement that a disability-
harassment plaintiff must prove that "she belongs to a protected
class" extends no further than the ADA "qualified individual with
a disability" definition, and is therefore essentially the same
standard that the Fourth Circuit used in Fox. Equally plausible,
however, is the possibility that the "protected class" to which the
Fifth Circuit referred is the broader class of people with disabilities.
Evidence within the opinions supports the latter reading. For
example, the Flowers court in no way indicated or evaluated the
plaintiffs qualifications. By contrast, the Fox court not only
considered Mr. Fox's qualifications, but because he had claimed
total temporary disability for workers' compensation benefits,
required him "'to proffer a sufficient explanation for any apparent
contradiction between the [ADA and workers' compensation]
63. Id. at 173 (alteration in original).
64. Id. at 179.
65. Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Serva., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2001).
66. Fox, 247 F.3d at 177.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
68. See Flowers, 247 F.3d at 235.
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claims."'6 9 If the prima facie elements enumerated by the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits are indeed the same, the disparate emphasis
placed on the plaintiff's qualifications in Fox and Flowers could be
the result of the way in which the parties framed the issues, and
the defenses the employers raised. The Flowers court, however,
included a footnote stating, "No party here argues that Flowers was
not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and we assume
arguendo that she was"7 --yet the court made no mention of an
assumption that Ms. Flowers was qualified. The fact that the court
addressed the disability issue even in the absence of argument by
the parties, but failed to consider Flowers' qualifications, suggests
that a "member of the protected group" is not the same as a
"qualified individual with a disability." Thus, based on the plain
language of the opinions and the Flowers court's failure to address
the plaintiffs qualifications, it appears that the evidentiary stan-
dards enumerated by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits are indeed
distinct.
A. The Qualification Requirement
Proceeding on the assumption that the Fifth Circuit standard
requires only that a plaintiff prove that she has a disability as
defined by the ADA, 7' it is the standard that should be adopted.
Although the Fox standard is derived from the language of the
ADA, the qualification requirement should be disregarded for two
reasons. First, an individual's perceived ability or inability to
perform a job function is irrelevant in determining whether she is
a victim of harassment. Although clearly a critical element in a
standard discrimination case, harassing behavior is not justifiable
simply because the subject of that harassment lacks the specific
qualifications for a particular position. Second, the imposition of a
qualification standard on people with disabilities, when no such
requirement is imposed on other civil rights harassment plaintiffs,
69. Fox, 247 F.3d at 177 (quoting EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373,378 (4th
Cir. 2000)).
70. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 236 n.6.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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perpetuates the stereotype that the disabled are incompetent-
precisely the social notion that the ADA was designed to combat.72
An inquiry into a candidate's credentials for a particular position
or type of employment is not only relevant, but essential to
determine whether an employer has impermissibly discriminated
against a person protected by Title VII or the ADA. Discrimination
in employment involves distinguishing between candidates based
on some characteristic or affording different treatment to a person
because she has or does not have a specific quality.7" Employers
may give preference in employment decisions for some reasons, but
not others. For instance, an employer may permissibly distinguish
between job candidates with differing educational backgrounds, or
between those that wear yellow socks and those that wear green
ones-but an employer that will hire Asian Americans but not
African Americans is certain to be on the losing end of a potentially
expensive lawsuit.
The courts have developed a now well-established body of law to
determine when an employer has unlawfully discriminated on the
basis of a characteristic protected by Title VII. The McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting test requires a plaintiff to prove that she
(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) applied and had the
necessary qualifications for the position in question; (3) was
rejected; and (4) thereafter, the employer continued to seek appli-
cations from persons having the complainant's qualifications.7
Once a plaintiff has proven these elements and established a prima
72. See id.§ 12101(aX7).
[Ilndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society ....
Id.
73. According to the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, to discriminate is "to make
a distinction in favor of or against a person or thing on the basis of the group, class, or
category to which the person or thing belongs rather than according to actual merit."
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 564 (2d ed. 1993). The definition of "harass" by
comparison is "to disturb persistently; torment, as with troubles or cares; bother continually;
pester; persecute." Id. at 870.
74. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to offer
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for its failure to hire or
promote the plaintiff.75 The plaintiff then must convince the finder
of fact that the employer's purported legitimate reason is merely
pretext.76 Note that although the plaintiff must prove that she is
qualified for the position, she must only show that she possesses the
"base, minimum qualifications the employer uniformly require [s].'7'
Federal circuit courts have applied a similar analysis to disability
discrimination cases. For example, the Sixth Circuit and Eighth
Circuits have adopted different formulations, although "in practice
they appear to operate in a similar manner.""8 The Sixth Circuit
adopted a five-prong requirement to establish a prima facie case.
[The] plaintiff must show that "(1) he or she is disabled; (2) [he
or she was] otherwise qualified for the position, with or without
reasonable accommodation; (3) [he or she] suffered an adverse
employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had reason to
know of the plaintiff's disability; and (5) the position remained
open while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled
individual was replaced.""
A plaintiff in the Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, must establish
"(1) that she was a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA,
(2) that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of
the job, and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination."0 Despite the variance in language, there is an
apparent consensus among courts presiding over both Title VII and
ADA cases that, for purposes of ascertaining whether an employer
has unlawfully discriminated against an employee or potential
75. Id.
76. Id. at 804.
77. HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND PRACTICE 140 (2001).
78. Id. at 461.
79. Id. at 460 (quoting Cehrs v. N.W. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 779
(6th Cir. 1998)) (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. (citing Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999)).
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employee, the plaintiff must establish a minimum level of qual-
ification to avoid summary judgment.
Harassment analysis, however, is distinct from an assessment of
discrimination. Although an employer may legitimately distinguish
between candidates or employees, it is difficult to imagine
circumstances under which an employer would be justified in
harassing an employee. For example, simply because a woman
hired to be a secretary is not proficient in using Microsoft Word
does not mean that Title VII tolerates inappropriate comments
'about the size of her chest. Rather, the distinction is between
actionable and nonactionable types of harassment or, as the
Supreme Court stated in Harris, whether the conduct is suffi-
ciently frequent or offensive as to be deemed severe or pervasive."'
Hence, whereas an examination of an employee's qualifications is
justified when considering whether an employer impermissibly
discriminated, a consideration of an employee's qualifications is
wholly irrelevant in determining whether he was the subject of
actionable harassment based on a protected characteristic.
Aside from being irrelevant, the imposition of the qualification
requirement on a disabled plaintiff tacitly suggests that some
people with disabilities are harassed, and permissibly so, because
they are in fact unqualified. In passing the ADA, Congress
recognized that the unequal treatment experienced by people with
disabilities "result[s] from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society .... 82 Requiring plaintiffs in disability-
based harassment suits, but not other harassment plaintiffs, to
establish their eligibility for a job reflects just such a "stereotypic
assumption."8 The guidelines set forth in Meritor and subsequent
81. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
83. Placing the burden of establishing qualification on the person with a disability not
only exposes an underlying assumption that at least some of the disabled are incapable; it
also reflects some courts' continuing adherence to the so-called medical model of disability.
The medical model views disability as a biological or physiological flaw that prevents
"normal" human functioning. Harlan Hahn suggests that "[mledicalizing disability may
result from confusing the notion of impairment, which refers to limitations attributable
solely to deficits of body or mind, with the notion of disability, which refers to restrictions
imposed on the individual by an environment that places the individual at a social or
economic disadvantage." Harlan Hahn, Disputing the Doctrine of Benign Neglect: A Challenge
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"hostile work environment" cases for establishing a claim of sexual
harassment do not include any requisite showing of a complainant's
qualifications for the job in question.84 By analogy, a complainant
in a disability-based harassment suit should not bear any greater
burden.
It may seem that if a person has been hired for a specific position,
she has already established her ability to perform the job, and thus
the qualification requirement poses no significant burden. However,
this ignores the facts of a case like Fox, where the plaintiff develops
the condition during his tenure of employment. A plaintiff that is
injured or acquires a disabling condition and is unable to perform
the essential functions of a job even with a reasonable accom-
modation may become unqualified for purposes of a standard
discrimination claim. Nevertheless, this does not justify harassing
conduct, nor should it relieve an employer of liability for such
behavior.
Yet the question remains whether the ADA can, consistent with
general rules of statutory interpretation, be read to protect a person
with a disability from harassment in the absence of evidence of his
qualifications. A reading of the ADA that omits the qualification
requirement is likely to make any good strict constructionist
cringe.85 Despite the traditional canon that a remedial statute
should be construed broadly to accomplish its intended purpose,86
"[1]iberal construction ... has become a very pejorative term in
certain political and legal circles."87 Despite their differences,
most liberal and strict constructionists agree that when the
"plain meaning" of a statute is "clear and unambiguous," courts are
to the Disparate Treatment ofAmericans with Disabilities, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 269, 270 (Leslie
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES].
84. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
85. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 681,681 (1990) (describing the liberal construction of remedial statutes as one
of his "most hated legal canards" and "among the prime examples of lego-babble").
86. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and In the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800,807-08 (1983) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n,
425 U.S. 1, 12 (1976)).
87. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with StrictandLiberal Construction, 64 ALB.
L. REV. 9, 37 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
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obligated to follow the language.88 Yet even the most devout
textualist will, or at least should, reject a liberal interpretation
when such a reading leads to absurd results.89
The ADA was originally passed to respond to the problem of
discrimination. 9° As previously noted, a "qualified individual with
a disability" is one "who, with or without a reasonable accom-
modation, can perform the essential function of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires."" Because the
qualification requirement is tied to the "essential function" and
"reasonable accommodation" inquiries,92 to the extent that this
inquiry is irrelevant in assessing a harassment claim, the adjective
"qualified" should be disregarded. When courts read the statute
expansively to prohibit harassment based on disability, a strict
reading of the qualification requirement indeed leads to absurd
results: A person who is harassed based on his disability is
ineligible for protection under the ADA simply because his condition
precludes him from fully performing his job. Harassment and
discrimination analyses are distinct. If, with or without a reason-
able accommodation, the employee is unable to complete his job,
his employer may dismiss him. Harassment, however, is not an
acceptable alternative.
B. Defining Disability
Even if the "member of a protected group" standard is accepted
in favor of the more narrow requirement in Fox, given the dispos-
88. Id. at 45-46.
89, Id. at 23-27.
90. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000); see supra note 39.
92. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 796 (1999) (contrasting a
claim of total disability for SSDI purposes and an ADA claim and holding that these claims
can coexist, because unlike the ADA, the SSA 'does not take into account the possibility of
'reasonable accommodation'); Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17
(1987) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985)) ("In the employment context, an otherwise qualified
person is one who can perform nthe essential functions' of the job in question."); Brennan v.
Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1262 (5th Cir. 1988) ('Reasonable accommodation'] is part of the
'otherwise qualified' inquiry ...."); Burgdorf, supra note 33, at 458 ("The interrelationship
between qualifications and the obligation of making reasonable accommodations ensures that
employers may not summarily determine what qualifications they wish to impose ....").
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ition of the current Supreme Court toward the term "disabled," "
disability harassment plaintiffs still face a high bar to overcome
summary judgment.9 ' The ADA's three-prong definition of a
disabled person includes any person who (1) has "a physical or
mental impairment," (2) has "a record of such [a physical or mental]
impairment," or (3) is "regarded as having such [a physical or
mental] impairment."95 To qualify for protection under the statute,
the "impairment" must substantially limit the individual's ability
to perform a major life function.96 In contrast to "impairment,"
"substantial limitation" and "major life function" are not defined
within the statute.
In Bragdon v. Abbott,97 the Supreme Court first addressed the
meaning of these provisions. The Bragdon Court found that Sidney
Abbott, an asymptomatic HIV-positive dental patient, was "sub-
stantially limited" in her ability to procreate, and therefore,
qualified for coverage under the ADA. 98 Ms. Abbott claimed that her
dentist had violated Title III in refusing to fill her cavity in his
office. 99 Though Abbott's inability to procreate is unrelated to a
dental appointment, in order to proceed on her public accom-
modation claim, she first had to establish that she was disabled
within the meaning of the statute. The majority of the Court agreed
that procreation is a major life function, and although Abbott was
asymptomatic, her status as a carrier of HIV substantially limited
her ability to bear children. 100
Any hopes for a broad definition of disability, however, were
dashed the following term. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,'°1
93. See infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
94. Summary judgment is disproportionately used to dismiss ADA-based complaints.
Defendants win 92.7% of ADA cases at the trial court level-they win the vast majority of
them upon motions for summaryjudgment. See Ruth Colker, TheAmericans with Disabilities
Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
96. Id. § 12102(2Xa).
97. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 629. The ADA prohibits discrimination in services by "public accommodations"
as well as by employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a).
100. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639-41.
101. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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Murphy v. UPS,"0 2 andAlbertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,°3 the Court
concluded that contrary to the opinion of the EEOC, mitigating
measures (including assistive devices and medications, as well as
the human body's natural ability to compensate for an impairment)
should be considered when determining whether a plaintiff is
disabled.104 Thus, twin sisters with severe myopia were denied
protection because their vision improved to 20/20 with the use of
corrective lenses; 0 5 a mechanic with hypertension was found not to
be substantially limited in a major life activity because his
condition could be controlled with medication;"° and lower courts
were instructed to consider the body's natural ability to compensate
when assessing whether a truck driver with monocular vision was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 07
In the Sutton/Murphy/Kirkingburg trilogy, the Justices'
interpretation of when an inability to work constitutes a substantial
limitation of a major life activity further restricted the class of
protected plaintiffs. According to the Sutton Court, "[w]hen the
major life activity under consideration is that of working, the
statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at a minimum, that
the plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of
102. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
103. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
104. In light of the Supreme Court's rulings in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg, the
EEOC rescinded several sentences of the Code of Federal Regulations regarding whether an
individual is disabled. The sentences had suggested that corrective or mitigating measures
should not be taken into account when determining whether a person is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 65 Fed. Reg. 36,327 (June 8, 2000).
The Court justified its refusal to follow agency guidance by stating:
The agency guidelines' directive that persons be judged in their uncorrected
or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the individualized inquiry
mandated by the ADA. The agency approach would often require courts and
employers to speculate about a person's condition and would, in many cases,
force them to make a disability determination based on general information
about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than
on the individual's actual condition.... This is contrary to both the letter and the
spirit of the ADA.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483-84; cf Rebecca Harmer White, Deference and Disability
Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. REV. 532 (2000) (arguing that Sutton was an appropriate case
for the Court to employ Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation of statutory terms).
105. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487-88.
106. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
107. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 567.
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jobs."' Thus, so long as the plaintiff is able to work at some job
utilizing her skills, it is irrelevant that she is unable to practice a
specific job in her chosen field, using her "unique talents."10 9
The Court continued this restrictive trend in a recent disability-
related decision. In Toyota v. Williams,"0 theplaintiff, who suffered
from carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments, sued Toyota
for failing, as her employer, to provide a reasonable accommodation.
The Court held "that to be substantially limited in performing
manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities
that are of central importance to most people's daily lives []" and
that such an impairment must also have a long term or permanent
impact."' Though the Court seemed to agree that Ms. Williams was
limited in her ability to perform occupation-specific tasks, and
recognized that "her medical conditions caused her to avoid
sweeping, to quit dancing, to occasionally seek help dressing, and
to reduce how often she plays with her children, gardens, and drives
long distances," the Court ultimately held that "[tihese changes in
her life did not amount to such severe restrictions in the activities
that are of central importance to most people's daily lives that they
establish a manual-task disability as a matter of law.""' The Court
remanded the matter for trial on the issue.
Despite Congress' original intent to afford expansive protection
to people with disabilities"' and the existence of EEOC guidelines
dictating a broad interpretation of the relevant provisions, courts
have consistently rendered a narrow construction of disability. The
result is a kind of Catch-22 for plaintiffs, placing "a rejected
applicant in the untenable position of emphasizing all the things he
or she cannot do in order to claim ADA protection, and then, once
through the courthouse door, downplaying limitations in order to
108. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
109. Id. at 492.
110. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
111. Id. at 198.
112. Id. at 202.
113. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. See generally Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The
Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA.
L. REV. 321 (describing the ADA and arguing that the Supreme Court's recent decisions are
contrary to Congress' intent).
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prove he or she is qualified for the job."114 Many scholars have
criticized judicial interpretations of the ADA, concluding that
federal courts have "developed no coherent pattern of thought about
whether a disease should be classified as a disability," nor
"formulated a coherent doctrine or a consistent line of argumen-
tation to account for why one worker is- qualified and another is
not."115
In attempting to explain the increasingly restrictive reading of
the ADA, commentators have arrived at widely disparate
conclusions to account for the judiciary's reluctance to adhere to
legislative intent and agency guidelines. One school of thought
argues that society generally, and the Supreme Court specifically,
is engaged in a backlash against the ADA.'16 According to these
academics, "restrictive judicial interpretations of the ADA reflect,
at best, a lack of understanding of the statute and, at worst, a
blatant hostility towards the profound goals of the ADA."' Still
others argue that although federal courts' interpretations may fall
short of "blatant hostility," the decisions are nonetheless laden
with the historical conceptions of disability and social accretion the
drafters of the ADA intended to prohibit."1 ' Recently though, a third
114. Arlene Mayerson & Matthew Diller, The Supreme Court's Nearsighted View of the
ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 83, at 124.
115. RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLEDJUSTICE: THE HISTORYOF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE
WORKPLACE 4-5 (2001).
116. An entire symposium issue of the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law
was devoted to precisely this critique. For an overview of the presenting authors' views, see
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA- Interdisciplinary
Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1 (2000).
117. Mayerson & Diller, supra note 114, at 125. Aviam Soifer argues that, at least in the
context of the Supreme Court's 1999 decisions, the latter is true. Aviam Soifer, The Disability
Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1327 (2000).
[Mlany of the Justices adamantly refused even to listen to the situations of the
individuals whose cases were before the Court. An unholy admixture of
ideological preconceptions and poor craftsmanship produced a new, remarkably
murky legal regimen in which individuals who claim disabilities must be willing
to be scrutinized minutely if they hope to satisfy the Court's new definitional
prerequisites.
Id.
118. In her recent book, Ruth O'Brien contends that modern judicial decisions are
influenced by the historical baggage of the ADA, and more specifically by the legacy of the
postwar rehabilitation movement. She claims that people with disabilities present a threat
to the workplace hierarchy because workers requesting accommodation "have the capacity
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explanation has been proffered: The Court's response to ADA cases
is neither the result of a misunderstanding or a backlash-it is
about economics. According to Professor Samuel Issacharoff and
Justin Nelson, the Court was faced with a poorly crafted statute
and narrowed the definition of disability as a means of imposing
a gatekeeping function on the ADA "to define defensible and
administrable boundaries for disability accommodation claims."" 9
Professor Samuel Bagenstos also posits an economic justification,
but suggests that the Court's narrow reading is not a response
to the expense of implementing the ADA; rather, the reading
effectuates one of the ADA's underlying goals. Far from engaging in
a backlash against the ADA, federal courts may be relying on a
dependence-avoiding rationale often marshaled to drum up support
for the statute both in the legislative debates and in the popular
media prior to the passage of the ADA. 2 ' Although Bagenstos
agrees that the courts have read the ADA in an unduly restrictive
manner, he argues that the statute was "sold to a significant extent
as a means of welfare reform," and that the Supreme Court's
interpretation is the result.'
to challenge the logic underlying work rules and regulations instituted by employers to
maximize profits." O'BRIEN, supra note 115, at 4. In response, work-related disability policy
following World War II was an attempt to "normalize" people with disabilities: Rather than
have the workplace adapt to them, vocational rehabilitation was an attempt to conform them
to the workplace. O'Brien concludes that "public support for the cultural values behind
vocational rehabilitation and the commensurate lack of support for the rights orientation
help explain why the employment provisions within the ADA have been so ineffectual." Id.
at 5. For a critique of O'Brien's arguments, see Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Employment
Policy, and the Supreme Court, 55 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2002).
119. Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 307, 320 (2001).
120. SamuelR. Bagenstos, TheAmericans with DisabilitiesActAs Welfare Reform, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 921 (2003).
121. Id. at 927. In another article, Professor Bagenstos proposed a more principled
method for reading the statute. In line with the goals of the disability rights movement,
"disability" should be understood as a socially defined group status marked by systematic
subordination and stigma. Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and 'Disability', 86
VA. L. REV. 397, 445 (2000). Under the antisubordinationist model, impairments that
.substantially limit" a "major life function" must be interpreted as those that have been
stigmatized by society either historically or in modern times. Id. This approach, Bagenstos
contends, conforms with constitutional theory and history, is coherent with civil rights
legislation, promotes the elimination of domination and oppression as urged by democratic
theorists, provides distributive justice to people with disabilities, forwards the utilitarian
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Whatever the Court's rationale, its increasingly narrow inter-
pretation of the ADA has broad ramifications for the effectiveness
of disability-based harassment as a cause of action. To the extent
that an individual is unable to establish that she is disabled
according to the Court's construction of the statute, she cannot sue
her employer for harassment based upon her physical impairment.
If, for example, one of the Sutton twins was regularly ridiculed for
wearing thick glasses, she would be unable to bring a claim in
federal court. Similarly, a person with relapsing-remitting multiple
sclerosis, who walked with a limp during periods of relapse, could
be mocked and mimicked by his employer with no right to legal
recourse if a court found that the occasional gait problem did not
amount to a substantial limitation on a major life function.
The Court has already made clear that it has no intention to
create a general code of civility in theAmerican workplace.'22 The
rationale for limiting the availability of harassment claims to
protected classes of people, of course, is largely based on the fear of
endless litigation and frivolous suits. One way to ensure that people
with disabilities are not subject to demeaning comments and crass
behavior at work, yet still avoid a flood of ADA litigation, would be
to "allow the definition of covered potential employees to remain
flexible and use the employer's reasonable accommodation obli-
gation to develop standards through the evolution of case law."'23
goal of eliminating dependency, and makes economic sense. Id. at 453-64.
Under this theory, Bagenstos claims that the Court's Bragdon decision "is eminently
justifiable," and although the Sutton/Murphy IKirkingburg trilogy may have in some ways
been decided on the wrong grounds, the outcomes of those cases may also be explainable. Id.
at 400. As a highly stigmatized disease, HIV is properly protected under the ADA. However,
Bagenstos suggests that instead of focusing on Sidney Abbott's inability to procreate, the
Court would have been on firmer footing if it had focused on the stigma attached to an HIV-
positive diagnosis. Id. at 402. In Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg, the Court, in Bagenstos'
opinion, correctly judged that the impairments themselves were not necessarily the subject
of stigma. Id. at 485. Nevertheless, he disagrees with the Court's analysis that to be limited
in the life function of working, one must be disqualified from a broad class of jobs. Rather,
he suggests, the appropriate standard should be whether the plaintiff suffered a stigmatizing
loss of status. Id. at 445-46.
122. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). But cf Rosa
Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace
Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 60 (1999) (advancing a "pluralistic" approach that employs both
Title VII and tort causes of action to protect those who "experience severe harassment on the
job, but who would be hard pressed to assert that their harassment was 'because of sex....").
123. Issacharoff& Nelson, supra note 119, at 322.
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Even if courts adopted such a broad interpretation of "disability,"
a plaintiff "still cannot prevail on a claim of discrim- ination unless
she can prove that the employer took action 'because of' that
impairment ... and that she can ... 'perform the essential functions
of the job." 24 Such an approach would protect those injured by
disability-based harassment, and yet maintain safeguards against
baseless discrimination claims.
IV. GAUGING SEVERITY AND PERVASIVENESS
Although the initial question in a disability-based harassment
case is whether a plaintiff is eligible for protection under the ADA,
a court must ultimately determine whether, in fact, the employer
has engaged in conduct rising to the level of actionable harassment.
Courts and academics alike have wrestled with the appropriate
standard to evaluate an employer's conduct. The debate centers
around whether conduct should be gauged from the subjective
perspective of the complainant, or an abstract objective vantage
point. As indicated in Part I of this Note, the Supreme Court in
Harris held that to bring an actionable claim, a plaintiff must prove
that a reasonable person would find the work environment
objectively hostile or abusive, and that subjectively, the plaintiff
herself found it to be so. Justice Scalia, however, wrote a concurring
opinion in Harris emphasizing the difficulty of assessing whether
a workplace is objectively hostile.
"Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean
the same thing) does not seem to me a very clear standard-and
I do not think clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb
"objectively" or by appealing to a "reasonable person['s]" notion
of what the vague word means. Today's opinion does list a
number of factors that contribute to abusiveness ... but since it
neither says how much of each is necessary (an impossible task)
nor identifies any single factor as determinative, it thereby adds
little certitude. As a practical matter, today's holding lets
virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct
engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to
124. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
("because of") and § 12111(8) ("essential functions")).
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warrant an award of damages. One might say that what
constitutes "negligence" (a traditionaljury question) is not much
more clear and certain than what constitutes "abusiveness."
Perhaps so. But the class of plaintiffs seeking to recover for
negligence is limited to those who have suffered harm, whereas
under this statute "abusiveness" is to be the test of whether
legal harm has been suffered, opening more expansive vistas of
litigation. Be that as it may, I know of no alternative to the
course the Court today has taken.1"
Justice Scalia is not the only, one troubled by the ambiguity
surrounding "abusiveness" and the "reasonable person" standards.
One problem, of course, is determining to what extent an
individual's personal characteristics can be considered without
completely stripping the reasonable person standard of its
objectivity.
A. The Reasonable Person in Sexual Harassment Analysis
The reasonable person standard has come under fire in the Title
VII harassment context for failing to address the unique concerns
of harassment victims. Critics contend that the standard reflects
the views of white men, upholds the status quo, and fails to ac-
count for the experiences of people victimized by harassment.126
In Ellison v. Brady,'27 for example, the Ninth Circuit found that the
reasonable person standard "tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women."12 Reasoning
that "[clonduct that many men may find unobjectionable may
offend many women, " 129 the court adopted the "reasonable woman"
standard in order to forward the underlying policies of Title VII and
"ensure[] that courts will not 'sustain ingrained notions of reason-
able behavior fashioned by the offenders.'" 3
125. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. See, e.g., Jane Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and
the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151 (1994).
127. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
128. Id. at 879.
129. Id. at 878.
130. Id. at 881 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Keith, J., dissenting)). In the Sixth Circuit, Judge Keith advocated the use of a reasonable
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The reasonable woman standard also has its critics, however.
Among the litany of concerns with the standard is that it patronizes
and marginalizes women, 3 1 overemphasizes the similarity of
women's experiences and fails to account for their differences, 132
lends itself to overreaction and undue censorship of speech,'33 and
sacrifices consistency by inviting a multitude of possible stan-
dards.13 4 Perhaps more importantly, though, it appears that the
woman standard in his Rabidue dissent. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626. For other courts
employing a gender specific standard, see Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., No. 99-
35668,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 28010(9th Cir. Sept. 12,2001); Hurleyv. Atl. City Police Dep't,
174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); Robinson
v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
131. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1415 (1992) ("Not only does it
remind us of earlier stereotypes of women as more pure and moral than men, but it also
reduces women's experiences ... to the margins of acceptance.") (footnote omitted); Dolkart,
supra note 126, at 204 ("[A] reasonable woman standard marginalizes women. It suggests
reasonable women are different from reasonable men, who remain the dominant norm.");
Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 635 (1993) ("[T]he reasonable woman standard further
entrenches a perceived hierarchy of differences between men and women. Codification of
such differences in a legal standard cannot help but interfere with genuine legal and social
equality.").
132. Cahn, supra note 131, at 1416-17; Johnson, supra note 131, at 635-38.
133. Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 819
(1993) ("[C]ompanies faced with potential liability under rapidly evolving and vague
standards may feel the need to protect themselves by adopting intrusive and, ultimately,
unfair, workplace restrictions.") (footnote omitted). For one perspective on the First
Amendment implications of harassment law generally, see Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as
Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the FirstAmendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481
(1991); Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563
(1995). Both Professors Browne and Volokh argue that the promises ofthe First Amendment
and the implementation of antidiscrimination law are frequently incompatible, because a
policy designed to ensure equality for one group may have the effect of censoring another's
speech. But cf J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295
(1999) (contending that collateral censorship resulting from hostile environment restrictions
does not offend the First Amendment); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight,
47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461, 559 (1995) (arguing that although harassment law may have a
chilling effect on some protected speech, 'the degree of chilling is not substantial either in
quantity or quality and is vastly outweighed by the invidious discrimination prohibited by
hostile environment law").
134. Adler & Peirce, supra note 133, at 822-24; Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J.
1177 (1990).
[One might argue that the result of this critique is an infinite regress, for a
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reasonable woman standard has little to no real impact on the
outcome of cases. In a recent series of studies concerning the effect
of the standard on participants' evaluation of harassment claims,
researchers concluded that "the legal standard had very little im-
pact onjudgments, accounting for a maximum of 2% of the variance
in respondents' assessment of hostile work environment sexual
harassment."13
B. The Reasonable Person in Disability Harassment Cases
Many of the criticisms leveled at the reasonable person standard
in the context of sexual harassment are equally applicable in
cases of disability-based harassment. A standard based on the
experiences of white, able-bodied, mentally capable men fails to
appreciate the perspective of someone with an atypical physical
or mental characteristic. As with the adoption of the reasonable
woman standard, one possible response is to adopt a "reasonable
person with a disability" standard.
The reasonable person with a disability standard, however, is
subject to some of the same infirmities that plague the reasonable
woman standard. First, the effect of imposing a specific standard
for those with disabilities advances the notion that the disabled are
somehow outside of the "norm.""3 " Employing a different standard
"reasonable black woman" standard would still ignore differences of class, a
"reasonable lower class black woman" standard would ignore differences of
sexual orientation, etc. But that both misses the point and is the point.... In
short, the goal of employing an "objective" test that is unaffected by the judge's
(or any other) world-view and that is sufficiently general to apply to all people
is simply an illusory one.
Id. at 1218.
135. Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination,
5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 596, 623 (1999); see also Johnson, supra note 131, at 655-65
(surveying representative cases and concluding that"the reasonable woman standard cannot
be shown to have made such a difference"); Ehrenreich, supra note 134, at 1218
("Encouraging a formalistic reliance on doctrine, [Judge Keith's] reasonable woman test [in
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)] obscures the fact that doctrinal
constructs like consensus are merely vehicles for articulating value choices, not determinants
of results.").
136. Distinguishing between a "person" and a"person with a disability" suggests that the
former is "normal," but the latter is not. Ron Amundson argues, however, that like race,
"normality of function" is not a biological fact, but social myth. True, biological diversity does
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for people with disabilities paints them as weak, hypersensitive, or
somehow less than objectively rational, and perpetuates the
"harmful notion that courts should extend a paternalistic hand" to
protect them.13 7 Second, the use of a reasonable person with a
disability standard presumes that a disability is equivalent to an
impairment and ignores the role of socially constructed barriers in
an individual's ability to function. In other words, it reinforces the
medical model of disability contrary to the intent of the ADA.138
Further, comparable to the reasonable woman standard, the
reasonable person with a disability standard is all at once too
objective and too subjective. With regard to the former, the
standard does not account for the experience of all people with
disabilities, but only for those with what we consider a typical
experience. 1' 9 On the other hand, the standard is inherently victim-
focused, moving increasingly closer to a subjective, individualized
inquiry."0O
Frank Ravitch proposes an even more specific standard, that of
a "reasonable person with the same disability.""' This standard,
according to Ravitch, incorporates the substantive law of the
ADA, the structure for Title VII hostile work environment claims,
and EEOC definitions of harassment. 142 However, in contrast to
the EEOC-proposed "reasonable person in the same or similar cir-
cumstances" or traditional "reasonable person" standards, which
are "too imprecise to be uniformly applied," Ravitch contends that
exist, and although there may be more or less common modes and levels of function, one is
not "normal" and the other abnormal." According to Amundson, '[t lo call a typical or average
species member 'normal' is to assume a blueprint in the developmental process that simply
does not exist." Ron Amundson, Biological Normality and the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES, supra note 83, at 102, 105.
137. Johnson, supra note 131, at 635.
138. See Hahn, supra note 83, at 270.
139. Cf Cahn, supra note 131, at 1416-17. ("A second problem with the reasonable woman
standard is that it does not accommodate the experiences of all women.... Women who have
suffered the requisite type of conduct have been harassed or raped; others who suffer
different types of behavior, or react differently to accepted behaviors, have no claim.").
140. Cf id. at 1417 (-[Tlhe reasonable woman standard is victim-focused.").
141. Ravitch, supra note 14, at 1505-09. Note that plaintiffs in relatively recent disability
harassment cases have forwarded this same argument. See Casper v. Gunite Corp., No. 99-
3215,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16241 (7th Cir. July 11, 2000); Pirolli v. World Flavors, Inc., No.
98-3596, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18092 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1999).
142. Ravitch, supra note 14, at 1505-06.
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his proposal is a more clear standard that takes account of the
unique concerns and sensitivities of individuals with specific
disabilities. 4 ' A blind person may not be offended by the same
conduct that insults a paraplegic, and therefore, he reasons, we
should not treat them the same.
Ravitch's proposal, however, faces some unique problems in
addition to those posed by the adoption of a reasonable person with
a disability standard. First, it is unclear at what level of specificity
a trier of fact should consider a complainant's disability. Should a
jury make its determination based only on a consideration of the
impairment or on the source of the impairment? In other words,
should we view the harassment from the perspective of a person
who is unable to walk, or from the perspective of someone who is
unable to walk because they have multiple sclerosis? Ravitch
suggests that the appropriate consideration will be based on the
nature of the harassment. Thus, if a person is harassed on the basis
of a hearing impairment, the standard should be that of a
reasonable person with a hearing impairment, but if the harass-
ment is directed solely at those who are completely deaf, the
standard should be that of a reasonable deaf person.'" Although it
may be possible to find experts capable of testifying about the types
of behavior that a deaf person might find insulting, 145 this approach
potentially requires employers to research and understand the
types of comments and conduct that might be insulting to people
with rare disabilities and uncommon diseases.
Second, as discussed previously, there is a distinction between an
impairment (the actual biological atypicality) and a disability
(largely the result of socially imposed barriers). Pursuant to
Ravitch's proposal, is there room for this distinction? For instance,
imagine two men each of whom is missing his left leg-one uses a
wheelchair, the other has a prosthetic leg. Though they may share
the same impairment, arguably their disability is different, and
arguably they may experience the same harassing words or conduct
differently.
Third, Ravitch's reductionist standard minimizes the similarity
of experience between people with disabilities and could fracture
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1506-07.
145. Id. at 1507-08.
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the unity that made the ADA possible. For example, although light-
skinned and dark-skinned blacks may experience harassment
differently, we nevertheless view their common experience as more
important than their differences. Similarly, the proposed
reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases does not
account for differences between women who are pre-menopausal
and those that are post-menopausal, or women with large breasts
and those with small breasts. Rather, we presume that because
women share a salient characteristic-having breasts, for
instance-that it is irrelevant whether a woman is harassed
because her chest is larger or smaller than average. Likewise,
people with disabilities have something in common-biological
atypicality. By analogy, we should not focus on the difference
between their disabilities, but rather should emphasize similarity
of experience to enhance the civil rights of all people with
disabilities.
Fourth, a reasonable person with the same disability standard is
especially problematic with regard to its application to people with
mental disabilities. According to the court in Pirolli v. World
Flavors, Inc.:146
[T]he direct application of [the reasonable person with the same
disability standard] is problematic, particularly when a mental
disability is involved. Unlike gender or race, a mental disability
can have such a decisive influence over a plaintiffs perception
that even the most innocent of conduct could be found to be
objectively abusive or hostile to a reasonable person with a
particular mental disorder. If courts were to modify the objective
test to account for each particular mental disability suffered by
every plaintiff, the objective test could lose its objectivity.4 '
In sum, the court seems to ask whether there is such a thing, for
instance, as a reasonable person with schizophrenia?
Finally, as with any type of objective or modified objective
standard, Ravitch's standard is, in and of itself, an empty concept.
A reasonableness standard "gains meaning only from the content
given it by the triers of fact. Simply using the words "reasonable
woman" [or "reasonable person with a disability" or "reasonable
146. No. 98-3596, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18092 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1999).
147. Id. at *21 n.9.
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person with the same disability"] does not provide a context or
perspective within which to evaluate conduct." 48 Perhaps this lack
of independent meaning explains why the "reasonable woman"
standard has had such a modest effect, and by analogy, is the
reason any type of disability-centered standard would be subject to
the same fate.
Unless and until social attitudes toward minorities (including
women and people with disabilities) change, perhaps no standard
can adequately address the unique concerns ofthesegroups and yet
maintain the necessary objectivity to protect employers from
frivolous lawsuits by hypersensitive employees. To make a choice
among any of the competing standards necessarily involves a kind
of balancing test to weigh the relative costs and benefits. The
reasonable person standard is not without its flaws, but given the
likely modest effect that the use of a victim-focused standard would
have, and the potential cost it would impose on people with
disabilities and society at large, the reasonable person standard
should be maintained as the standard in disability-based harass-
ment cases. When a finder of fact does employ a contextualized
approach, an individual's personal characteristics should be
considered only to the extent that those characteristics are
apparent to or known by the employer. Though it is useful to
understand a victim's characteristics and past experience, there are
some aspects of a person's history into which ajudge or jury should
not inquire and which an employer cannot be expected to know.
These aspects suggest the outer limits of a contextualized
reasonableness approach.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits' explicit recognition of a hostile
environment claim under the ADA was a critical first step in
protecting people with disabilities from harassing conduct in the
workplace. Nevertheless, courts that are confronted with disability-
based harassment suits in the future must decide which plaintiffs
are eligible for protection under the ADA, and determine the
appropriate standard for analyzing such claims. In such instances,
a plaintiff should only have to prove that she is a "member of the
148. Dolkart, supra note 126, at 200.
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protected group" in order to establish a prima facie case, or in other
words, she must prove only that she has a disability within the
meaning of the ADA. Courts should not require any showing of
qualification, a requirement that is unnecessary in the harassment
context and perpetuates stereotypes regarding the competence of
people with disabilities-precisely the type of idea the ADA was
intended to guard against. Furthermore, in assessing whether an
employer's conduct rises to the level of actionable harassment, the
traditional reasonable person standard will accomplish the goal of
eradicating harassing behavior without the potential costs
associated with disability-specific standards. This Note is an
attempt to reconcile the framework of Title VII and the mandate of
the ADA in order to generate a consistent approach to harassment
law. Guided by these analytical tools, courts will be able to develop
the appropriate standards for this "new" cause of action.
Holland M. Tahvonen*
* Many thanks to Professor Michael Ashley Stein for his advice and guidance, and also
to Professor Mark Weber for his helpful comments on earlier versions of this Note.
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